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Abstract
This paper analyzes the contribution of anticipated capital and labor tax shocks
to business cycle volatility in an estimated New Keynesian DSGE model. While ﬁscal
policy accounts for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle frequencies,
the anticipated component hardly matters for explaining ﬂuctuations of real variables.
Anticipated capital tax shocks do explain a sizable part of inﬂation and interest rate
ﬂuctuations, accounting for between 5 and 15 percent of total variance. In line with
earlier studies, news shocks in total account for 20 percent of output variance. Further
decomposing this news eﬀect, we ﬁnd that it is mostly driven by stationary TFP and
non-stationary investment-speciﬁc technology.
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11 Introduction
The current paper analyzes the role of news about future ﬁscal policy (“ﬁscal news”), and
in particular the anticipation of tax rate changes, for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Recent
macroeconomic research has increasingly shifted from explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations
through contemporaneous shocks to explaining them by anticipated, or news, shocks. Rational
agents, anticipating future changes will already react today to these news (see e.g. Beaudry
and Portier 2004, 2006, Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2010). However,
most empirical studies on the eﬀects of anticipated shocks on business cycles have focused on
news about future productivity (see e.g. Forni et al. 2011, Fujiwara et al. 2011, Khan and
Tsoukalas 2010).1
This is remarkable for two reasons. First, ﬁscal measures are usually publicly debated well
in advance and often known before becoming eﬀective, i.e. there are considerable decision and
implementation lags. A tax bill typically takes about one year from the U.S. President’s initial
proposal to the law’s enactment and another year until the tax change becomes eﬀective
(Mertens and Ravn 2011, Yang 2005). As a recent example, consider the Patient Protection
and Aﬀordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), whose core contents were debated for almost one
year and whose ﬁnancing provisions will only phase in gradually over time. Second, surprise
ﬁscal policy shocks have long been discussed as a potential prominent driver of the business
cycle (see e.g. Baxter and King 1993, Cardia et al. 2003, Jones 2002, McGrattan 1994).
McGrattan (1994) for example attributes one third of the U.S. business cycle variance to
distortionary taxation. 2 This potential importance of ﬁscal policy shocks, combined with the
fact that many ﬁscal policy measures are known well in advance, makes ﬁscal news a natural
candidate for explaining aggregate ﬂuctuations.
We add upon the previous literature by explicitly analyzing the business cycle variance
contribution of ﬁscal news. For this purpose, we employ a New Keynesian DSGE model
featuring several real and nominal rigidities as well as various shocks identiﬁed as important
drivers of the business cycle and augment it with a government sector ﬁnanced through
distortionary labor and capital taxes. Our main focus lies on the eﬀects of ﬁscal news, but
we also control for anticipation in technology, investment-speciﬁc productivity, and the wage
markup. The model is estimated by full information (Bayesian) methods using quarterly
U.S. data from 1955 to 2006. Model-based estimation allows us to circumvent the issue of
non-invertibility typically encountered when estimating structural VARs in the presence of
1There is a prominent literature branch dealing with the importance of ﬁscal foresight. However, its focus
has mostly been on analyzing single tax events (House and Shapiro 2006, Parker 1999, Poterba 1988) or
tracing out the consequences for econometric analyses (Leeper et al. 2011, Yang 2005).
2Although Forni et al. (2009) ﬁnd that unanticipated tax shocks contribute little to macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations of the Euro area, this could in principle be the result of ignoring ﬁscal foresight.
2anticipation eﬀects (Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2007, Hansen and Sargent 1991, Leeper et al.
2011).3
Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we ﬁnd that while ﬁscal policy accounts
for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle frequencies, ﬁscal news generally
only plays a very limited role. Its contribution to output variance ranges around 3 percent.
With a variance share of 10 percent at the 5 year forecast horizon, government spending is
the ﬁscal variable with the largest eﬀect on output variance. However, this contribution only
comes from surprise shocks, with anticipated spending shocks explaining virtually nothing.
Contemporaneous and anticipated capital tax shocks each contribute 2 − 3 percent to output
ﬂuctuations. However, they are considerably more important for explaining inﬂation and
interest rate ﬂuctuations. Depending on the forecast horizon, surprise capital tax shocks
contribute roughly 30 percent to their variance. Anticipated capital tax shocks are responsible
for 5 to 15 percent. The eﬀect of contemporaneous and anticipated labor taxes, on the other
hand, is negligible.
In line with previous studies that do not consider news shocks (e.g. Smets and Wouters
2007), we ﬁnd that the main drivers of the output variance are preference and wage markup
shocks. News shocks explain on average 20 percent of the variance of output, with the main
eﬀect coming from news about TFP and investment-speciﬁc productivity. This result conforms
well with i) VAR evidence (Barsky and Sims forthcoming), ii) evidence coming from a factor
model (Forni et al. 2011), and iii) other DSGE-based estimates of the importance of news
shocks, who all ﬁnd a similar fraction of output ﬂuctuations explained by anticipated shocks.
The two papers most closely related to ours are recent contributions by Mertens and Ravn
(forthcoming) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The former use a VAR to analyze the
business cycle contribution of narratively identiﬁed anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks.4
They ﬁnd that both types of tax shocks together explain 20 to 25 percent of output variance,
with anticipation accounting for the majority. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) evaluate
the role of news about TFP, investment-speciﬁc technology, wage markup, and government
spending shocks in an estimated RBC model with various real rigidities. In their setup, news
shocks account for 41 percent of output ﬂuctuations. But while they ﬁnd government spending
shocks to explain 10 percent, evenly distributed across surprise, one and two year anticipated
shocks, they do not consider foresight about the ﬁnancing side of the government budget
3Non-invertibility means that the DGSE-model has a VARMA representation that cannot be inverted
to yield a ﬁnite-order VAR in the observables. Hence, the true innovations do not perfectly map into the
VAR residuals, meaning that the structural shocks cannot be recovered using a VAR. For alternative ways to
mitigate this problem, see e.g. Sims (2009), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), and Forni et al. (2011).
4Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming) classify the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks according to the time
passed between the presidential signing of a bill and the tax changes becoming eﬀective into anticipated and
contemporaneous shocks.
3constraint.
Our paper is also related to other DSGE-based papers focusing on the eﬀects of anticipated
technology shocks. Davis (2007), using a New Keynesian model, estimates news shocks to
be responsible for 50 percent of output ﬂuctuations. Fujiwara et al. (2011) extend the
New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005) to include
news about TFP. They estimate news shocks to explain 9 percent of output variance in
the unconditional variance decomposition. The paper of Khan and Tsoukalas (2010) uses
the same basic New-Keynesian model framework, but additionally allows for news about
investment-speciﬁc technology growth. In their estimated model, both types of news shocks
together account for less than 10 percent. Finally, Auray et al. (2009) estimate a New
Keynesian model with an additional durables sector, featuring news about TFP in both
sectors. They ﬁnd that technology news in the non-durables sector explain 52% of output
variance.
The outline of the paper is the following. Chapter 2 introduces the DSGE-model with
ﬁscal foresight, while chapter 3 presents the estimation approach and results. In chapter 4,
we compute variance decompositions and impulse responses. Chapter 5 concludes.
2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight
We use a medium-scale DSGE-model featuring various real and nominal frictions as well as a
variety of shocks that have been identiﬁed as important drivers of the business cycle (see e.g.
Justiniano et al. 2010a, Smets and Wouters 2007). The model is an extended version of the
basic model used in Born and Pfeifer (2011), where we incorporate both contemporaneous and
anticipated elements into the shock processes as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow
for non-stationary shocks. We ﬁrst discuss the information structure of the shock processes in
the next section before describing the model in detail.
2.1 Shock Structure
Our model features 10 sources of stochastic ﬂuctuations. On the government side, we include
shocks to labor and capital tax rates τn and τk, a shock to government spending g, and a
monetary policy shock ξR. The technology shocks considered are shocks to stationary neutral
productivity zt, non-stationary productivity Xt, stationary investment-speciﬁc productivity
zI
t, and non-stationary investment-speciﬁc productivity At. In addition, the model includes a
preference shock ξ
pref
t and a wage markup shock  w
t .
The monetary policy shock and the preference shock are assumed to only contain a
4contemporaneous, unanticipated component. For the other shocks, we follow the framework
proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow for both contemporaneous shocks
and shocks that are anticipated 4 and 8 periods in advance. Anticipation horizons of 4 and 8
quarters fulﬁll the aim of capturing longer anticipation horizons while keeping the state space
at a manageable level. This is crucial as each additional anticipation horizon is an additional
state variable. While speciﬁcally choosing 4 and 8 quarters of anticipation might be seen as
arbitrary, this assumption can be rationalized by the workings of the political system. Four
quarters of anticipation are close to the average length of a tax bill from the President’s
proposal announcement to enactment (Yang 2005). Eight quarters serves as a plausible upper
bound for the anticipation of shocks to tax rates as Congressional elections take place every
two years. We think this makes it very unlikely that people are able to correctly predict both
the reigning majority and the tax laws being implemented by the next Congress. The same,
of course, applies to spending bills. For reasons of symmetry, we then assume this anticipation
structure for all shock processes.















i,t−j, j ∈ {0,4,8} denotes a shock to variable i that becomes known in period t−j and
hits the economy j periods later. For example, ε4
τn,t−4 denotes a four period anticipated shock
to the labor tax rate that becomes known at time t − 4 and becomes eﬀective at time t. The
shocks are assumed to have mean 0, standard deviation σ
j
i, to be serially uncorrelated, and
to be uncorrelated across anticipation horizons, i.e. E(ε
j




j = 0, k = l, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, they are uncorrelated across shock types im,in ∈ i,
E(εk
im,tεl
in,t−j) = 0 ∀j,k,l and im  = in, .
The assumed information structure implies that agents foresee future shocks to the extent
of already known but not yet realized shocks εm
i,t−j, m > j. The forward-looking behavior of
rational optimizing agents results in them reacting to anticipated shocks even before they
are realized. By imposing a structural model on the data, this anticipatory behavior enables
the econometrician to achieve identiﬁcation. However, it is exactly this foresight that makes
identifying the shocks with a VAR impossible. The econometrician attempting to do this only
uses current and past values of the observables and thus has a smaller information set than
the agents. In particular, he is missing the anticipated but not yet realized shocks as states in
his VAR.5 To remedy this issue, structural estimation has been advocated (Blanchard et al.
5Sims (2009) shows that in some cases it may be possible to recover the shocks using a structural VAR. By
including enough lags and forward-looking variables, it may be possible to move the non-invertible root(s)
close enough to unity so that the discrepancy between true structural errors and the estimated ones becomes
52009). We will pursue this avenue in Section 3 by using Bayesian methods to estimate the
proposed model.
2.2 Conceptualizing Tax Shocks
The tax shocks considered in the present work do not necessarily stem from actual changes in
the labor and capital tax rates. Rather, they are interpreted as the probability weighted eﬀect
of tax actions under legislative debate or due to judicative decisions. They are the product
of the likelihood of a tax change and the size of this eﬀect, as perceived by rational agents
forming expectations about the future path of taxes. Hence, our deﬁnition is wider than the
one considered by Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming), who restrict their attention to the shocks
directly deriving from the legislative process. Shocks deriving from e.g. the SEC suing against
the legality of a tax shelter would be excluded from their deﬁnition but not from ours. Note
that news shocks are distinct from pure uncertainty about future taxes. While the former are
associated with an anticipated change in the mean of the tax rate, tax uncertainty shocks can
be conceptualized as mean-preserving spreads.6
To ﬁx ideas, consider the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act of 2010 as an example.
On June 9, 2009, a ﬁrst draft of the health care bill was released. At that time, people at
the latest could anticipate that taxes were going to rise in order to ﬁnance the bill, if it ever
passed. However, both the size and the likelihood of such a change was largely unknown. The
ﬁrst point of uncertainty changed on July 13, 2009, when the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
published oﬃcial cost estimates: If passed, marginal income tax rates were going to increase
by 22 percentage points for households between 100% and 400% of the poverty level. Taking
these costs as given, households were experiencing tax shocks with changes in the likelihood
of the passage of the bill. Intrade bets on the passage of the bill show that some people were
constantly reevaluating this likelihood. Figure 1 presents the closing prices of an Intrade
betting contract that paid 100, if a health care reform bill was passed into law before mid-2010
and 0 if a health care reform bill was not passed. Hence, the closing price is a direct measure
of the likelihood of a bill becoming law. There is a large variance in the probability of passing
the bill that varies with the ebb and ﬂow of the political process. These changes potentially
act like a huge sequence of tax shocks for households. If one considers only the change in
the likelihood from the time directly after the Massachusetts Senate election in January to
the ﬁnal vote of the bill, this amounts in expectations to a tax shock of 0 7 × 22% = 15 4%
small.
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Figure 1: Intrade Daily Closing Prices:“Will ’Obamacare’ health care reform become law in
the United States?”
Note: This contract will settle (expire) at 100 ($10.00) if a health care reform bill is passed into
law before midnight ET 30 Jun 2010. It will settle (expire) at 0 ($0.00) if a health care reform
bill is not passed into law. Source: intradeTM(http://www.intrade.com/)
2.3 The Model
The model economy includes ﬁve sectors: the household sector with a large representative
household, the labor market featuring a continuum of monopolistically competitive unions
selling diﬀerentiated labor services to intermediate ﬁrms, the ﬁrm sector including a continuum
of intermediate goods ﬁrms producing intermediate goods and a ﬁnal good ﬁrm bundling the
intermediate goods, and the government sector responsible for ﬁscal and monetary policy.
2.3.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative household with a continuum of members.
Household preferences are deﬁned over per capita consumption Ct and per capita labor eﬀort
Lt, where each member consumes the same amount and works the same number of hours.8
7Unfortunately, due to the non-availability of data for the relative price of investment, our sample does not
cover this series of events.
8Due to the symmetric equilibrium, the decisions of the household members are identical. Hence, we
suppress the subscript denoting individual members.
7We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) and assume that household members supply
their labor uniformly to a continuum of unions j ∈ [0,1]. The unions are monopolistically
competitive and supply diﬀerentiated labor services lt(j) to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Overall,
total labor supply of the representative household is given by the integral over all labor
markets j, i.e. Lt =
  1
0 lt(j)dj. We will discuss the labor market structure in detail below.
Following Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), we assume a preference speciﬁcation that allows



















Here, the parameter φc ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence, σc ≥ 0
governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor eﬀort.9 The term




makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work eﬀort. This preference
speciﬁcation introduces the parameter σs ∈ (0,1] that allows to govern the magnitude of the
wealth eﬀect on the labor supply. As special cases, the speciﬁcation nests the preference class
discussed by King et al. (1988), i.e. σs = 1, and the preferences proposed by Greenwood et al.
(1988), i.e. σs = 0, where the latter case implies a zero wealth elasticity of labor supply. We
assume the preference shock ξ
pref
t to follow an AR(1)-process in logs:
logξ
pref




t   (4)








































Besides labor income from supplying diﬀerentiated labor services lt(j) at the real wage Wt (j),
the household has capital income from renting out capital services utKt at the rental rate
RK
t , from receiving ﬁrm proﬁts Ξt, and from investing in bonds Bt+1, which are in zero net
9In a recent paper, Nutahara (2010) shows that it is important to distinguish between internal and external
habits in a model with news shocks. He ﬁnds that internal habits are able to generate news-driven business
cycles, whereas external habits are not.
8supply. Both forms of income are taxed at their respective tax rates τn
t and τk
t . Only net





(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt + Bt
Pt is the after-tax
return. In addition, the government pays lump sum transfers.
The household spends its income on consumption Ct and investment zI
tAtIt, where It
denotes gross investment at the price of capital goods. We assume that the relative price of
investment in terms of the consumption good is subject to two shocks, a stationary investment-
speciﬁc productivity shock zI
t and non-stationary investment-speciﬁc technological progress
At (see Greenwood et al. 1997, 2000). The relative price of investment is equal to the technical
rate of transformation between investment and consumption goods. Changes in this price do
not aﬀect the productivity of already installed capital, but do aﬀect newly installed capital
and become embodied in it. For the non-stationary investment-speciﬁc technology process,
we assume a random walk with drift in its logarithm
logAt = logAt−1 + log 
a
t   (6)
The drift term  a



















a,t−8   (7)
The stationary investment-speciﬁc technology shock zI
t follows an AR(1)-process
logz
I








zI,t−8   (8)
Depreciation allowances are an important feature of the U.S. tax code, therefore, we
also include them in our model. They are captured by the term Φt in equation (5) and
have the form Φt = τk
t
 ∞
s=1 δτ(1 − δτ)
s−1zI
t−sAt−sIt−s, where δτ is the depreciation rate for
tax purposes.10 Since depreciation allowances provide new investment with a tax shield at
historical costs, they may be important in capturing the dynamics of investment following
shocks (Christiano et al. 2007, Yang 2005).






















It   (9)
Household members do not simply rent out capital, but capital services utKt, where ut denotes
10Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to diﬀer from the physical
rate.
9capital utilization. Thus, they decide about the intensity with which the existing capital stock
is used. However, using capital with an intensity that is higher than normal is not costless, but
leads to higher depreciation of the capital stock. This is captured by the increasing and convex
function δ (ut) = δ0+δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2(ut − 1)
2, with δ0,δ1,δ2 > 0. Without loss of generality,
capital utilization in steady state is normalized to 1. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we
assume the presence of investment adjustment costs S (It/It−1) = κ/2
 
It/It−1 −  I
 2
to
dampen the volatility of investment over the business cycle. κ > 0 is a parameter governing
the curvature of the investment adjustment costs and  I is the steady state growth rate
of investment, which is equal to the steady state growth rate of capital. This speciﬁcation
assures that the investment adjustment costs are minimized and equal to 0 along the balanced
growth path, i.e. S = S′ = 0 and S′′ > 0, where the primes denote derivatives.
The household maximizes its utility, equation (2), by choosing Ct, Lt, St, Bt+1, Kt+1, ut,
and It, subject to the budget constraint (5), the law of motion for capital (9), and the resource
constraint for aggregate labor given by (10) below.
2.3.2 Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by diﬀerentiated labor services and staggered wage setting.
To model these features without letting idiosyncratic wage risk aﬀect the household members,
and thus making aggregation intractable, we assume a continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0,1]. The
household members supply their labor lt (j) equally to the unions, which are monopolistically
competitive and supply diﬀerentiated labor lt (j) to intermediate ﬁrms at wage Wt (j). Every
period, a union j is able to re-optimize its wage with probability (1 − θw), 0 < θw < 1. A
union j that is not able to re-optimize indexes its nominal wage to the price level according
to Wt (j)Pt = (Πt−1)
χw ¯ Π1−χw 
y
tWt−1 (j)Pt−1, where the parameter χw ∈ [0,1] measures the
degree of indexing, ¯ Π is steady state gross inﬂation, and  
y
t is the gross growth rate of
output (see e.g. Smets and Wouters 2003). Thus, in the absence of price adjustment the wage
still partly adapts to changes in productivity and inﬂation (Christiano et al. 2008), thereby
assuring that no current wage contract will deviate arbitrarily far from the current optimal
wage.
Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the cur-
rent wage. Unions that can reset their wages choose the real wage that maximizes the
expected utility of its members, taking into account the demand for its labor services
lt (j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)
−ηw,t L
comp
t , where L
comp
t is the aggregate demand for composite labor











and the aggregate wage level Wt =




1−ηw,t. The time-varying substitution
elasticity ηw,t allows us to include a wage markup shock  w



















w,t−8   (11)
Including a wage markup shock is motivated by the ﬁnding that this shock is important for
explaining output ﬂuctuations (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2010, Smets and Wouters
2007).
2.3.3 Firm Sector
A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms i, i ∈ [0,1], produces
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods Yit via a Cobb-Douglas production function, using capital
services uitKit and a composite labor bundle L
comp
it







where α is the capital share, zt is a stationary TFP shock, Xt is a non-stationary labor
augmenting productivity process, and XY
t is the trend of output deﬁned in Appendix B. The
ﬁxed cost of production ψ is set such that proﬁts are 0 in steady state and there is no entry
or exit (Christiano et al. 2005). The composite labor bundle is aggregated from diﬀerentiated









For the non-stationary labor augmenting productivity process Xt, we assume a random
walk with drift in its logarithm
logXt = logXt−1 + log 
x
t  (13)
The drift term  x




















Hence, in the deterministic steady state, the natural logarithm of the non-stationary component
of the neutral technology shock grows with rate  x. The stationary technology shock zt
11follows an AR(1)-process with persistence ρz







We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
an intermediate ﬁrm i can re-optimize its price with probability (1 − θp), 0 < θp < 1.
If a ﬁrm i cannot re-optimize the price, it is indexed to inﬂation Πt = Pt
Pt−1 according to
Pit+1 = (Πt)
χp (¯ Π)1−χpPit, where χp ∈ [0,1] governs the degree of indexation. The intermediate
ﬁrms maximize their discounted stream of proﬁts subject to the demand from the ﬁnal good
producer, equation (17) below, applying the discount factor of their owners, the household
members.
The intermediate goods are bundled by a competitive ﬁnal good ﬁrm to a ﬁnal good Yt
using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with substitution elasticity ηp
Yt =














Yt ∀i   (17)
2.3.4 Government Sector
Government expenditures are ﬁnanced by taxing proﬁts and the return to capital services at
the rate τk
t and labor income at the rate τn
t . Following McGrattan (1994) and Mertens and
Ravn (forthcoming), we model average tax rates as AR(2)-processes
τ
n














































where τk,τn ∈ [0,1) are parameters determining the unconditional mean. Using average
eﬀective tax rates may be a problem for labor income taxes, because usually the tax code is
progressive. However, the clearly simplifying assumption can be justiﬁed on grounds that
dynamics of marginal and average tax rates are very similar (Mendoza et al. 1994).
Government spending Gt, which may be thought of as entering the utility function
additively separable, displays a stochastic trend XG
t . Log deviations of government spending


















where gt = Gt
XG
t denotes detrended government spending and ρg is the persistence parameter.
The stochastic trend in Gt is assumed to be cointegrated with the trend in output. This
assures that the output share of government spending Gt/Yt is stationary, while at the same














Lump sum transfers Tt are used to balance the budget. Thus, the government budget
constraint is given by11










t utKt + Ξt
 
− Φt  (22)
We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that reacts to





























where ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of gradual
movements in interest rates (see e.g. Clarida et al. 2000). The parameters φRY and φRΠ
capture the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to deviations of inﬂation and output
growth from their steady state values. We assume that the central bank responds to changes
in output rather than its level as this conforms better with empirical evidence and avoids the
need to deﬁne a measure of trend growth that the central bank can observe (see Lubik and
Schorfheide 2007). ξR
t is the i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
3 Model Estimation
We use a Bayesian approach as described in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-
Villaverde (2010). Speciﬁcally, we use the Kalman ﬁlter to obtain the likelihood from the
state-space representation of the model solution and the Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis-
Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and Ramamurthy 2010) to maximize the posterior
11Note that private bonds are in zero net supply.
13Table 1: Parameters ﬁxed prior to estimation
Parameter Value Target/Motivation (matched to quarterly data)
σc 2 Common in RBC models
γ 0.0216 Set labor eﬀort in steady state to 20%
β 0.99 Common in RBC models
δ0 0.025 Annual physical depreciation of 10%
δ1 0.0486 Set capacity utilization u = 1 in steady state
δτ 0.05 Twice the rate of physical depreciation δ0 (Auerbach 1989)
α 0.2935 Match capital share in output
ψ 0.0432 Set proﬁts to zero
ηp 10 Set price markup to 11% in steady state
ηw 10 Set wage markup to 11% in steady state
 y 1.0045 Match average sample growth rate of per capita output
 a 0.9957 Match average sample growth rate of relative price of investment
τn 0.1984 Match average sample labor tax rate
τk 0.3880 Match average sample capital tax rate
G/Y 0.2031 Match average sample mean
¯ Π 1.0089 Match average sample mean
likelihood.12
3.1 Data
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1955:Q1 until 2006:Q4 and include twelve observable time
series: the growth rates of per capita GDP, consumption, investment, wages and government
expenditure, all in real terms, the logarithm of the level of per capita hours worked, the growth
rates of the relative price of investment and of total factor productivity, the log diﬀerence of
the GDP deﬂator, and the federal funds rate. Since our main objective are the eﬀects of tax
shocks, we also include capital and labor tax rates.13
3.2 Fixed Parameters
Prior to estimation, we ﬁx a number of parameters to match sample means (see Table 1).
The curvature of the utility function σc is set to 2. This value is consistent with most DSGE
models. The discount factor β is ﬁxed at 0 99. We set the parameter that governs the
12We used a t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom as proposal density. The posterior distribution was
computed from a 10,000 draw Monte Carlo Markov Chain, where the ﬁrst 2,500 draws were discarded as
burn-in draws.
13Detailed data sources and the observation equation that describes how the empirical time series are
matched to the corresponding model variables can be found in Appendices D and C.
14disutility of labor eﬀort γ such that labor eﬀort in steady state is 20%. We assume an annual
physical depreciation rate of 10%, which corresponds to a δ0 of 0 025 per quarter. Following
Auerbach (1989) and Mertens and Ravn (2011), we set the depreciation rate for tax purposes
δτ to twice the rate of physical depreciation, i.e. 0.05. The depreciation parameter δ1 is ﬁxed
to set the steady state capacity utilization to 1 (Christiano et al. 2005). The parameter α
is 0 2935, which matches the capital share in output over our sample, and the ﬁxed cost
parameter ψ is set to ensure zero proﬁts in steady state. We assume a steady state price and
wage markup of 11% and thus set ηp and ηw to 10.
The steady state gross growth rates of per capita output  y and of the relative price of
investment  a are set to their sample means of 1 + 0 45% and 1 − 0 43%. The parameters τk
and τn, which determine the unconditional mean of the tax rates, equal the post-war sample
means of 0 388 and 0 1984. We set the steady state ratio of government spending to output
G/Y to 0 2031, which also corresponds to the sample mean. The steady state inﬂation rate
corresponds to the average sample mean of 1 0089, i.e. annual inﬂation of 3 6%
3.3 Priors
Tables 2 and 3 present the prior distributions. Where available, we use prior values that are
standard in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters 2007) and independent of the underlying




2, are essentially left
unrestricted, but we impose stability of the AR(2)-processes.14 The other autoregressive




, are assumed to follow a beta distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. We assume the standard deviations of the shocks to
follow inverse-gamma distributions with prior means 0 1 and standard deviations 2. For the
parameters of the Taylor-rule, φRΠ and φRY , we impose gamma distributions with a prior
mean of 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, while the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR has the
same prior distribution as the persistence parameters of the shock processes. The habit
parameter φc is assumed to be beta distributed with a prior mean of 0 7, which is standard
in the literature. Following Justiniano et al. (2010b), the parameter determining the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply σl is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a prior mean
of 2 and a standard deviation of 0.75. The prior distribution for the parameter governing
the wealth elasticity of labor supply σs is a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.2. We impose an inverse-gamma distribution with prior mean of 0.5 and standard
deviation of 0.15 for δ2/δ1, the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to capacity
14Speciﬁcally, we impose a uniform prior for each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the stability
region (−1,+1). Let ξ1 and ξ2 be the roots of such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive parameters
corresponding to these roots can be recovered from: ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2 .
15utilization. The parameters governing the indexation of prices and wages, χp and χw, each
are beta distributed with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. For the Calvo parameters θw
and θp we assume a beta distribution with a prior mean of 0.5, which corresponds to price and
wage contracts having an average length of half a year (Smets and Wouters 2007). Finally, we
follow the literature (e.g. Justiniano et al. 2010a, Smets and Wouters 2007) and impose a
gamma prior with mean 4 for the parameter controlling investment adjustment costs κ.
3.4 Posterior Distribution
The last four columns of Tables 2 and 3 display the mean, the standard deviation and the
90%-posterior intervals for each of the estimated parameters. Most estimated parameters
and shock processes are in line with previous studies on the determinants of business cycle
ﬂuctuations, both with those using only contemporaneous shocks (e.g. Justiniano et al. 2010a,
Smets and Wouters 2007) as well as those including contemporaneous and anticipated shocks
(Fujiwara et al. 2011, Khan and Tsoukalas 2010, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2010).
However, some estimates deserve further comment. We ﬁnd a considerable degree of
internal habits with φc = 0 86, which is right between the estimates obtained by Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The posterior mean of the parameter
governing the wealth elasticity (σs = 0 1) implies a very low wealth elasticity of labor supply
and, thus, preferences that are close to the ones proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988). Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2010) ﬁnd an even lower wealth elasticity that is almost zero. Khan and
Tsoukalas (2010), on the other hand, estimate the wealth elasticity of labor to be quite high
at 0.85. A possible explanation for these diﬀering estimates is the inclusion of government
spending as an observable. Increases in government spending may entail positive consumption
responses (Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Galí et al. 2007),15 a behavior which can be explained
by a New-Keynesian model with a low wealth elasticity (Monacelli and Perotti 2008). Thus,
including government spending as an observable, as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and we
do, restricts the parameter governing the wealth elasticity to a low value in order to account
for this eﬀect. On the other hand, without the observable government spending as in Khan
and Tsoukalas (2010), this parameter remains mostly unrestricted with regard to the eﬀects
of government spending on consumption.16
Turning to the nominal rigidities in our model, we ﬁnd that prices are on average adjusted
about every three quarters, while the Calvo parameter for wages implies a high degree of
wage stickiness. The degree of price indexation is low (χp = 0 06) and in a similar range as
15For a dissenting view, see Ramey (2011).
16A small wealth eﬀect also helps in explaining the empirical behavior of labor market variables (Galí et al.
2011).
16in Justiniano et al. (2011). Wages, on the other hand, are indexed to inﬂation with a higher
proportion than prices (χw = 0 6), which corresponds well with the estimates in Smets and
Wouters (2007).
The parameters of the Taylor rule are in line with previous estimates (e.g. Clarida et al.
2000). They imply a high degree of interest rate smoothing (ρR = 0 86), a strong response
to inﬂation (φRΠ = 2 96), and a moderate value for the standard deviation of the monetary
policy shock (σR = 0 251%).
With the exception of the non-stationary technology shock, all shocks are estimated to
be highly persistent, with AR(1)-coeﬃcients ranging from 0.94 for the government spending
shock to 0.99 for the preference, the stationary technology, and the non-stationary investment-
speciﬁc technology shock. The non-stationary productivity component has a relatively low
serial correlation of 0.34, a value commonly found in the literature (e.g. Justiniano et al.
2011).
The contemporaneous shock as well as the 4 quarter anticipated non-stationary technology
shock have relatively low standard deviations of 0.04% and 0.03%, respectively, whereas
the two year anticipated shock is the most important one with a standard deviation of
0.6%. A similar pattern emerges for the stationary technology shock. In this case, however,
the standard deviation of the unanticipated component has a similar size as the 8 quarter
anticipated component, 0.74% and 0.73%, whereas the 4 quarter anticipated shock is less
important with a standard deviation of 0.18%.
Examining investment-speciﬁc technology shows that investment-speciﬁc growth displays
the same pattern as neutral technology growth. The shock with the longest anticipation
horizon is the most important one, having the highest standard deviation (σ8
a = 0 14%),
albeit in this case it is only slightly higher than the one for the contemporaneous shock
(σ0
a = 0 11). The 4 quarter anticipated shock, on the other hand, is negligible (σ4
a = 0 04%).
In contrast, for stationary investment-speciﬁc technology anticipation does not play a role, the
standard deviations are less than 0.05%, while the unanticipated stationary shock component
has a higher standard deviation than the unanticipated non-stationary investment-speciﬁc
technology shock (σ0
zI = 0 31%).
Another shock, where the anticipated shock components are negligible, is the wage markup
shock. While the standard deviation of the unanticipated shock is relatively high, the
anticipated shocks have very low standard deviations that are below 0.04%. In contrast, the
surprise wage markup shock has a high standard deviation of almost 46%, which is consistent
with evidence from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Galí et al. (2011), who showed this shock
to be the most important driver of business cycles.17
17 Note that the shock applies to the net markup so a 46% shock increases the markup from 11% to about
17Next, we direct our focus to the ﬁscal policy shock processes. Both tax processes show a
very high persistence, with the roots of the autoregressive processes implying autoregressive
parameters of ρn
1 = 0 770, ρn
2 = 0 228, ρk
1 = 1 604, and ρk
2 = −0 605, respectively.18 The
posterior estimates suggest that for government spending and labor taxes ﬁscal foresight is
rather limited. The unanticipated government spending shock has a volatility of 3%, a value
also found by Leeper et al. (2010). The volatilities of the anticipated shock components, on
the other hand, are rather small, σ4
g = 0 03% and σ8
g = 0 04%. A similar pattern emerges
for the labor tax process τn
t . The shock with the largest volatility is the unanticipated
component ε0
τn,t with 0.48%, while the anticipated components have a similar size as the
anticipated government spending shocks. Only for the capital tax rate, news shocks display a
higher standard deviation. Particularly, compared to the shocks to the labor tax process, the
shocks εi
τk,t−i to the capital tax process τk
t display a much higher volatility. The unanticipated
component ε0
τk,t has the highest standard deviation of 0.92%, while the anticipated components
have smaller, but still sizeable standard deviation, σ4
τk = 0 46% and σ8
τk = 0 65%.
4 Business Cycle Eﬀects of Fiscal News
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamic eﬀects of ﬁscal news. Given the estimated
deep parameters of the model, we compute forecast error variance decompositions to trace
out the shocks’ contributions to business cycle volatility. To better understand the dynamic
eﬀects of news shocks, we then analyze their transmission into the economy in Section 4.2.
4.1 Variance Decomposition
4.1.1 Results
We use our estimated model to analyze the quantitative importance of the diﬀerent anticipated
and surprise shocks for explaining business cycles. To this end, we compute conditional
and unconditional forecast error variance decompositions for the growth rates of output,
consumption, investment, hours, wages, the Federal funds rate, and inﬂation (see Table 4).19
Overall, we ﬁnd that news shocks on average explain between 10 and 30 percent of the
16%. Chari et al. (2009) point out that wage markup shocks cannot be distinguished from labor supply shocks.
For policy makers this distinction matters, since both shocks entail diﬀerent policy implications (Galí et al.
2011). However, as we are not interested in optimal policy, it is not important to identify the two shocks
separately.
18The high persistence of the labor tax rate has, for example, been documented in Cardia et al. (2003).
19For ease of exposition we have combined the two anticipated shock components into one and left out
three anticipated shocks (stationary investment-speciﬁc, wage markup, and government spending) that each
contributed less than 0.01 percent to the variance of the variables.
18variance of the variables considered. However, ﬁscal foresight only plays a very limited role.
Of the three types of ﬁscal foresight we consider, only the anticipated capital tax shock has
a sizeable variance contribution. While news about future capital taxes contribute only 2
percent to output growth variance, they matter for inﬂation and interest rate variability,
explaining more than 10 percent of the variability of inﬂation and interest rates at forecast
horizons longer than three years. This makes them the third largest source of inﬂation and
interest rate volatility, only behind preference and unanticipated capital tax shocks. Together,
surprise and anticipated capital tax shocks explain around 40 to 50 percent of inﬂation and
interest rate ﬂuctuations. In contrast, news about labor tax and government spending shocks
explain at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any of the seven variables considered.
More important than ﬁscal foresight are the surprise components of the ﬁscal variables.
As already noted, besides the preference shock, the surprise capital tax shock is the most
important factor for the variance of the Federal funds rate and inﬂation. Moreover, it accounts
for 2 to 3 percent of output ﬂuctuations. While the surprise government spending shock ε0
g
accounts for almost 10 percent of the output growth variance at the ﬁve year horizon and even
more at shorter horizons, it hardly contributes anything to the other variables’ ﬂuctuations.
Whereas ﬁscal foresight seems to be of only minor importance for the ﬂuctuations of output,
consumption, and investment, other news shocks contribute signiﬁcantly to their variance.
The news shocks that matter most are news about stationary technology, which account
for 8 to 12 percent of the variance of output and consumption. News about non-stationary
technology mostly aﬀects the volatility of wages, predominantly at long horizons. At the
ﬁve year horizon, it is the single most important factor aﬀecting wage volatility. News about
non-stationary investment-speciﬁc technology explain around 8 percent of the variance of
investment at all horizons and about the same amount of the variance of hours (at the ﬁve
year horizon). In contrast, the news components of stationary investment-speciﬁc technology
and the wage markup shock account for at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any variable
we consider.
In general, the importance of news shocks increases at longer forecast horizons. E.g.,
anticipated shocks account for a larger share of output volatility at the ﬁve year horizon (21%)
than at the one year horizon (11%).
Turning to the surprise shocks, we ﬁnd the most important drivers of business cycles to be
wage markup, preference, and unanticipated technology shocks. At business cycle frequencies,
these shocks combined explain about 60 to 70 percent of the ﬂuctuations of real variables.
E.g., at the 20 period forecast horizon, these three shocks account for 31, 21, and 16 percent
of output volatility, respectively. Inﬂation and interest rate variability are mostly explained by
preference and capital tax shocks, whereas wage ﬂuctuations are mainly driven by technology
19shocks, especially anticipated non-stationary technology shocks. Lastly, the monetary policy
shock plays a minor role in accounting for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, a result similar to
Smets and Wouters (2007). It explains around 15 percent of the Federal funds rate volatility,
but only at the short term, i.e. horizons of about one year, and has much smaller contributions
for the other variables.
4.1.2 Discussion
Using a DSGE-based estimation approach to determine the importance of news about ﬁscal
policy, we ﬁnd that ﬁscal foresight only plays a minor role in explaining business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Speciﬁcally, using full information Bayesian estimation and accounting for
diﬀerent kinds of shocks, we ﬁnd tax shocks and, in particular, news about taxes to explain
about 5 percent of output growth ﬂuctuations. This compares to about 25 percent in the VAR
study of Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming), indicating that the rigid anticipation structure
and the strict exogeneity assumption in the latter paper may be problematic (see also Leeper
et al. 2011).
Our estimates also attribute less than one third of output ﬂuctuations to surprise tax
shocks, which was found by McGrattan (1994). However, her paper only featured TFP,
government spending, and tax rate shocks. In contrast, our analysis features a richer set of
shocks commonly thought to be essential for explaining business cycles (Chari et al. 2007,
Smets and Wouters 2007).
Regarding the evidence on the eﬀects of news shocks on the business cycles, our result of
10 to 30 percent of the variance of output growth being attributable to anticipated shocks
squares well with the evidence found by Forni et al. (2011) and Barsky and Sims (forthcoming).
Using a factor model, Forni et al. (2011) ﬁnd that around 20 percent of output volatility is
explained by technology and 10 percent by news about technology, while Barsky and Sims
(forthcoming), in a VAR, attribute 10 to 40 percent to news shocks.
Fujiwara et al. (2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2010), using an estimated DSGE model
with nominal rigidities, ﬁnd a technology news contribution to output variance of 8.5 and 1.6
percent, respectively, which is lower than our own estimates. On the other hand, Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2010) ﬁnd that news about technology account for as much as 41 percent
of output variance. Part of this higher number can be attributed to the absence of nominal
rigidities in their model (Khan and Tsoukalas 2010). Overall and consistent with these studies,
news shocks contribute a higher share to the unconditional variance of nominal variables
(wages, inﬂation, interest rate) than to the variance of real variables (output, consumption,
investment, hours). However, allowing anticipation not only for TFP but also for other shocks,
leads to a higher relative contribution of news shocks. Whereas the contribution of anticipated
20shocks in the study by Fujiwara et al. (2011) ranges from 4 percent (to the variance of
investment) to 15 percent (to inﬂation volatility), we ﬁnd contributions of anticipated shocks
(combining all shocks) between 19 percent (investment and consumption volatility) and 52
percent (variance of wages).
Turning to the role of unanticipated shocks, we see that while the investment-speciﬁc
technology shock has been identiﬁed as an important driver of business cycles by previous
studies (Davis 2007, Fisher 2006, Justiniano et al. 2010a), it is of lesser importance in our
case and contributes a smaller fraction to ﬂuctuations than TFP shocks. The contributions
of non-stationary investment-speciﬁc productivity vary between 5 and 15 percent, whereas
stationary investment-speciﬁc technology explains hardly 1 percent. The diﬀerence to the
previous studies ﬁnding the high contribution of investment-speciﬁc technology stems from
our decision to include the relative price of investment as an observable. Recent studies
including the relative price of investment as an observable ﬁnd similarly small contributions
of investment-speciﬁc technology (Justiniano et al. 2011, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2010).20
However, we have to stress that both the stationary as well as the non-stationary investment-
speciﬁc productivity shock pertain to the relative price of investment and are accordingly
mapped to this observable.21 Thus, our stationary investment-speciﬁc technology shock is not
directly comparable to the stationary investment-speciﬁc technology shock in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2010). This could explain the starkly diﬀering results regarding the eﬀects of this
particular shock for output and investment ﬂuctuations, 30 to 60 percent in their case vs. less
than 1 percent in our case.
4.2 Impulse Responses
In order to better understand what drives the results of the previous section, we analyze the
impulse responses to stationary TFP shocks and to capital tax rate shocks. We choose to
focus on these shocks as they are the technology and ﬁscal policy shock, respectively, where
the anticipated component contributes most to business cycle variance.22
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to an unanticipated (solid line) and an eight period
anticipated (dashed line) one percentage point cut of the capital tax rate.23 The top left
20Models that do not use the relative price of investment as an observable variable usually imply wrong
moments for this series (Justiniano et al. 2011). When this problem is eliminated, the variance contribution of
investment-speciﬁc technology shocks tends to disappear.
21The observation equation in appendix (C) shows the exact mapping.
22Although we ﬁnd the preference and wage markup shocks to be the most important drivers of business
cycles, we omit analyzing their impulse responses as their importance and behavior is already well understood
(see e.g. Galí et al. 2011, Smets and Wouters 2007).
23For the surprise shock, this roughly corresponds to a one standard deviation shock as σ0
τk = 0 923%. For
the eight period anticipated shock, σ8
τk = 0 645%, so that we have re-scaled the size of this shock to make






























































Figure 2: Impulse responses to unanticipated and anticipated capital tax shocks.
Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated 1 percentage point cut of the capital
tax rate τk; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated 1 percentage point
cut of the capital tax rate τk that becomes known at t = −8 and eﬀective at t = 0. All
impulse responses are semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inﬂation and the policy rate are
measured as gross rates so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point changes.
22panel shows the impulse response for the capital tax rate that is shocked. The actual response
of the exogenous capital tax rate is the same after the surprise and anticipated tax shock,
because the only diﬀerence between the two cases is the time at which the tax change that
happens at t = 0 is known. But the other variables react diﬀerently, because with anticipation
the future realization of the tax rate is already known at t = −8 and agents immediately start
to optimally respond to this information.
First, consider the solid line representing the impulse responses to a surprise 1 percentage
point decrease in the capital tax rate. This tax cut acts expansionary and leads to an increase
in output, investment, and consumption on impact. The eﬀect is quite large due to the strong
estimated persistence of the shock process. Consistent with the evidence of high multipliers
for tax rates (Mountford and Uhlig 2009, Romer and Romer 2010), an initial 1 percentage
point decrease in the capital tax rate leads to a peak output response of 1.25 percent. Labor
and capital services increase in a hump shaped manner after the realization. For capital
services, this is driven by the higher after-tax rental rate that can be earned after the tax
cut. Note that the gross value of the rental rate decreases, reﬂecting the decreased tax wedge.
The increase in capital services also raises the marginal product of labor, leading to an initial
jump in the real wage as a fraction of unions is able to reset wages in the current period
and to a further rise over time when additional unions are able to reset their nominal wages.
The initial increase of the real wage is ampliﬁed by an overshooting of the nominal wage,
which is indexed to past inﬂation, due to a drop in inﬂation. Current inﬂation falls due to
the positive supply side eﬀect of the tax decrease. This positive eﬀect on inﬂation is also
the reason why the policy rate falls considerably, accommodating the expansion and further
fueling investment and consumption.
Although the impulse responses for the eight period anticipated tax shock look very
similar, there are two major diﬀerences. First, agents have more time to adjust and already
react during the anticipation phase. Hence, the impulse responses are now more drawn
out. Reacting immediately to an anticipated tax shock is optimal for the agents, because
the estimated degrees of consumption habits, capital adjustment costs, capital utilization,
and nominal rigidities imply that large abrupt changes in important choice variables are
welfare reducing and must be avoided. As a result of these more gradual and hence more
resource-saving responses, the peak responses of all variables are now higher than for the case
of a comparable surprise tax cut and generally occur earlier relative to the shock realization
at t=0. Note that relative to the announcement of the shocks, i.e. the point in time where the
horizon for the forecast error variance decomposition starts,24 the peak responses generally
both shocks comparable. Note that the impulse responses are semi-elasticities, i.e. they are measured in
percent of the steady state values of the corresponding variables.
24I.e. t=-8 for the anticipated shock and t=0 for the surprise shock.
23occur later for the news shocks. This peak response at later horizons for news shocks explains
why their importance in the forecast error variance decomposition tends to be larger at later
horizons.
Second, in contrast to the unanticipated shock, agents now substitute labor services for
capital services, leading to an immediate increase in the former and a decrease in the latter.
Only when the tax shock realizes, there is a jump in capital services. The higher production
resulting from the increase in labor services and the resources saved through the initially lower
depreciation resulting from the weaker capital use allows to increase consumption during the
anticipation phase. The net result of this substitution of labor for capital services with the
simultaneous increase in consumption and investment expenditures is a slight inﬂationary
pressure in the ﬁrst period. As a response, the central bank somewhat tightens its policy.
However, the negative supply side eﬀect of the input substitution subsides with the subsequent
further increase in labor supply. This increase is driven by the household’s desire to increase
the physical capital stock through investment while also keeping up consumption. As a result,
inﬂationary pressures abate and give room to an accommodating policy stance.
Note that physical investment in the capital stock slightly decreases initially. This behavior
is due to the depreciation allowances, whose present value for new investment decreases with
the future tax bill from which it is deducted. But, in contrast to the results of Mertens and
Ravn (2011), this incentive to disinvest is rather mild. Hence, in our estimated model, the
announcement of a tax cut is insuﬃcient to generate the investment-driven slump during the
anticipation phase of a tax cut found in their model. This diﬀerence can be explained by the
diﬀerent estimation procedures used. Mertens and Ravn (2011) rely on an impulse response
matching technique, where the empirical impulse responses were derived from a VAR using
a narrative identiﬁcation scheme. The impulse responses to be matched by the model were
only the ones to anticipated and unanticipated labor and capital tax shocks. In contrast, our
estimation uses full information techniques and thus tries to match all moments given the full
set of exogenous driving forces of the model.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to one standard deviation surprise (solid line)
and anticipated (dashed line) stationary TFP shocks.25 The result of a surprise increase in
total factor productivity is a prolonged boom driven by both consumption and investment.
Consistent with a typical supply side shock, inﬂation decreases considerably with the central
bank lowering the policy rate by 20 basis points in response. This in turn leads to an increase
in the real wage and a subsequent increase in the labor services used.
For the eight period anticipated increase in technology, we observe an immediate increase
in output, investment, and consumption during the anticipation phase due to the entailed
25We scaled the news shock by 1.03 to have exactly the same standard deviation as the surprise shock.


























































Figure 3: Impulse responses to unanticipated and anticipated stationary TFP shocks.
Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated one standard deviation increase in
stationary TFP z; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated one standard
deviation increase in stationary TFP z that becomes known at t = −8 and eﬀective at t = 0.
All impulse responses are semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inﬂation and the policy
rate are measured as gross rates so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point
changes.
25wealth eﬀect. This boom occurs already before the technology has actually increased and
is fueled by a rise in both capital and labor services.26 In this regard, the response diﬀers
from the response to an anticipated capital tax shock, where a substitution of capital services
for labor services is observed. The reason for the diﬀerence is that, for the anticipated TFP
shock, agents have a stronger incentive to increase investment during the anticipation phase.
In contrast, for the anticipated capital tax shock, investment falls slightly on announcement
due to the decrease in the present value of the depreciation allowances.
Lastly, to better understand the contribution of capital tax and stationary TFP shocks to
business cycle variance, it is worth comparing the relative size and persistence of the impulse
responses of output, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate to these shocks. As can be seen
from the the upper right panels of Figures 2 and 3, the peak response of output to an average
TFP shock is about 80% higher than to an average capital tax shock, although the latter
is somewhat more persistent.27 This diﬀerence in the size of the output responses explains
why stationary TFP shocks are more important for the volatility of output than capital tax
shocks. In contrast, both the inﬂation and the policy rate responses to capital tax shocks
have higher peaks and show more persistence. In particular, the average surprise TFP shock
leads to a peak reduction in the nominal interest rate of -0.2%, while the average surprise tax
shock leads to a drop of -0.4%. As this larger response is also more persistent, the diﬀerence
in response sizes explains why capital taxes are rather important for the variance of inﬂation
and the nominal interest rate, while they are less important for explaining output variance.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the contribution of ﬁscal foresight about labor and capital tax rates
and government spending to business cycle volatility in an estimated New Keynesian DSGE
model. Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we found that ﬁscal foresight
only plays a limited role for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Its variance contribution was mostly
conﬁned to inﬂation and interest rate ﬂuctuations, where anticipated capital tax shocks were
responsible for between 5 and 15 percent of the total variance.
Our results show that accounting for ﬁscal foresight does not qualitatively alter the
importance of traditional business cycle factors like technology, wage markup, and preference
shocks (see e.g. Smets and Wouters 2007).
26This observation is consistent with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), who show theoretically that a low
estimated wealth elasticity of labor supply facilitates positive comovement of output, consumption, and hours
in response to TFP news.
27Note also that the average anticipated capital tax shock is roughly 40% smaller than the one depicted
due to re-scaling.
26Structural estimation always runs the risk of misspecifying the underlying model structure.
Hence, future work should test whether the results obtained here are robust against the speci-
ﬁcation of diﬀerent ﬁscal rules where taxes respond to debt and possibly output as in Leeper
et al. (2010) or Forni et al. (2009). Moreover, the role of the information structure assumed
in the present work should be further scrutinized as the particular choice of information
structures may matter (Leeper and Walker 2011).
27A Tables
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Preference and Technology Parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
φc Beta 0.7 0.1 0.858 0.014 0.834 0.880
σl Gamma 2 0.75 3.410 0.452 2.704 4.132
σs Beta 0.5 0.2 0.101 0.023 0.069 0.137
κ Gamma 4 1.5 4.860 0.425 4.128 5.526
δ2/δ1 Inverse-Gamma 0.5 0.15 0.280 0.023 0.243 0.316
χw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.590 0.069 0.486 0.704
χp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.059 0.024 0.022 0.098
θw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.938 0.006 0.927 0.948
θp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.662 0.009 0.646 0.676
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Preference Shock
ρpref Beta 0.5 0.2 0.991 0.003 0.987 0.996
σpref Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 40.383 11.382 22.511 57.325
Wage Markup Shock
ρw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.976 0.006 0.967 0.986
σ0
w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 45.692 7.160 34.538 58.147
σ4
w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.020 0.058
σ8
w Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.017 0.023 0.045
Stationary Technology Shock
ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.994 0.004 0.989 0.999
σ0
z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.738 0.043 0.663 0.806
σ4
z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.178 0.161 0.024 0.394
σ8
z Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.730 0.047 0.648 0.804
28Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Non-stationary Technology Shock
ρx Beta 0.5 0.2 0.336 0.059 0.245 0.438
σ0
x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.040 0.024 0.024 0.061
σ4
x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.021 0.047
σ8
x Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.601 0.028 0.554 0.645
Stationary Investment-Speciﬁc Productivity Shock
ρzI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.968 0.019 0.942 0.992
σ0
zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.313 0.021 0.274 0.342
σ4
zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.025 0.053
σ8
zI Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.017 0.023 0.053
Non-stationary Investment-Speciﬁc Productivity Shock
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.986 0.0062 0.9766 0.996
σ0
a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.114 0.011 0.095 0.130
σ4
a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.036 0.013 0.020 0.056
σ8
a Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.139 0.013 0.117 0.160
Taylor Rule and Monetary Policy Shock
ρR Beta 0.5 0.2 0.865 0.009 0.851 0.879
φRΠ Gamma 1.5 3 2.958 0.107 2.779 3.126
φRY Gamma 0.5 3 0.314 0.050 0.235 0.402
σR Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.251 0.011 0.234 0.268
Government Spending Shock
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.940 0.017 0.912 0.968
ρxg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.912 0.102 0.864 0.984
σ0
g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 3.024 0.124 2.815 3.217
σ4
g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.033 0.012 0.025 0.044
σ8
g Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.038 0.023 0.025 0.058
29Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 Percent 95 Percent
Labor Tax Shock
ξn1 Uniform 0 0.577 -0.228 0.046 -0.313 -0.164
ξn2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.998 0.001 0.997 0.999
σ0
τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.476 0.019 0.441 0.503
σ4
τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.024 0.051
σ8
τn Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.015 0.023 0.044
Capital Tax Shock
ξk1 Uniform 0 0.577 0.605 0.147 0.574 0.999
ξk2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.999 0.144 0.634 0.999
σ0
τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.923 0.045 0.856 0.997
σ4
τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.460 0.044 0.386 0.531
σ8
τk Inverse-Gamma 0.1 2 0.645 0.046 0.571 0.721
30Table 4: Variance Decomposition of Shocks (in %):


















GDP 5.00 35.26 24.03 7.98 0.01 0.65 0.27 1.96 2.09 1.48 18.43 0.46 0.00 2.11 0.25
Cons. 18.93 44.73 16.30 11.58 0.02 2.99 0.07 0.87 0.84 0.31 0.05 1.06 0.01 1.49 0.76
Invest. 37.59 17.99 20.53 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.41 7.75 7.91 2.08 0.04 0.09 0.00 1.86 0.12
Hours 3.29 48.73 4.29 7.96 0.03 0.84 0.07 9.48 5.61 4.11 8.91 0.66 0.00 0.13 5.89
Wages 7.39 2.65 50.01 3.35 0.65 0.09 0.12 8.72 5.51 1.71 0.18 0.05 0.00 17.58 1.99
FFR 16.46 2.39 17.85 1.10 0.00 0.20 0.01 5.62 9.99 15.01 0.75 0.00 0.00 29.51 1.11
Inﬂ. 19.15 6.82 25.09 0.53 0.00 0.08 0.03 4.24 8.05 2.04 0.17 0.03 0.00 31.75 2.02
8 Periods
GDP 11.18 35.13 20.52 9.54 0.01 0.68 0.26 1.83 2.75 1.04 12.76 0.44 0.00 2.96 0.90
Cons. 15.94 46.39 16.20 12.43 0.02 3.16 0.08 0.79 0.74 0.26 0.04 1.10 0.01 1.76 1.08
Invest. 41.33 18.32 15.61 5.40 0.00 0.03 0.35 6.19 7.88 1.29 0.02 0.09 0.00 2.76 0.72
Hours 8.78 52.59 6.56 9.78 0.01 0.98 0.13 6.64 5.49 1.78 2.87 0.68 0.00 0.61 3.09
Wages 6.53 2.41 44.66 11.78 0.53 0.52 0.12 7.65 4.77 1.52 0.16 0.05 0.00 15.14 4.15
FFR 21.19 3.23 12.88 0.86 0.00 0.22 0.01 4.50 10.55 5.54 0.42 0.00 0.00 35.54 5.06
Inﬂ. 22.27 7.10 17.80 1.90 0.00 0.07 0.02 3.01 6.82 1.39 0.15 0.03 0.00 31.29 8.14
20 Periods
GDP 21.15 30.89 16.43 9.13 0.01 0.98 0.21 1.58 3.44 0.87 9.89 0.39 0.00 2.89 2.12
Cons. 19.72 44.09 14.88 11.98 0.02 3.14 0.08 0.72 0.84 0.23 0.04 1.06 0.01 1.80 1.37
Invest. 45.16 16.75 12.51 5.79 0.00 0.17 0.28 5.04 8.13 1.07 0.03 0.09 0.00 2.73 2.24
Hours 22.63 50.14 4.20 4.30 0.00 0.25 0.12 5.14 8.29 0.49 0.71 0.67 0.01 1.52 1.52
Wages 6.16 2.26 18.65 8.87 0.20 48.45 0.06 3.00 2.22 0.64 0.06 0.02 0.00 6.08 3.31
FFR 31.49 4.15 5.45 1.94 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.64 5.08 1.53 0.17 0.00 0.00 30.96 17.48
Inﬂ. 31.97 6.27 9.91 3.44 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.74 3.85 0.76 0.10 0.02 0.00 25.83 16.06
Uncond. Variance
GDP 23.57 26.88 12.88 7.67 0.01 0.73 0.19 5.61 11.02 0.66 6.83 0.28 0.00 2.09 1.58
Cons. 24.27 37.52 12.06 9.74 0.01 2.45 0.07 3.75 6.54 0.20 0.04 0.83 0.00 1.43 1.08
Invest. 44.46 15.95 9.61 5.26 0.00 0.14 0.22 7.14 12.98 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.85 1.56
Hours 46.58 16.62 2.83 2.68 0.00 0.09 0.06 9.97 18.68 0.11 0.15 0.96 0.01 0.67 0.59
Wages 19.01 4.34 13.37 6.78 0.14 32.83 0.05 6.53 9.74 0.45 0.05 0.02 0.00 4.26 2.42
FFR 31.89 1.64 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.46 2.76 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.25 26.22
Inﬂ. 31.43 1.69 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 2.53 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.33 26.16
Notes: Variance decompositions are performed at the posterior mean. ε0
i represents contemporaneous shock components; ε
4,8
i represents the sum of the
4 and 8 quarter anticipated shock components. For ease of exposition, we leave out anticipated stationary investment-speciﬁc, wage-markup, and
government spending shocks, since these shocks contribute less then 0.01% to the variances of the variables.
3
1B Stationary Equilibrium
In order to derive a state-space representation of the model, the model presented in the main
text is solved by using a ﬁrst-order perturbation method. However, due to the two integrated












the model has to be detrended ﬁrst in order to induce stationarity and to have a well-deﬁned
steady state. Yt,Ct and Wt inherit the trend XY
t = A
α











Kt and It inherit the trend XK
t = A
1
α−1Xt and thus grow with
 
k
t =  
I
















due to the assumed cointegrated trend with output.












The detrending is performed by dividing the trending model variables by their respective trend.
For the estimation of our structural model, these stationary model variables are matched to
the data presented in Appendix D.
32C Observation Equation
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where ∆ denotes the temporal diﬀerence operator, ¯ L denotes the steady state of hours worked,
 y is the steady state growth rate of output29,  a is the steady state growth rate of the relative
price of investment, τk and τn are the steady state tax rates, TFPt = ztX
1−α
t is total factor
productivity, and R is the steady state interest rate. The hats above the variables denote log
deviations from steady state.
D Data construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s NIPA
Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1955Q1 until 2006Q4.
Capital and labor tax rates. Our approach to calculate average tax rates closely







≈ ˆ Lt + log ¯ L  






























29This is also the growth rate of the individual components of GDP along the balanced growth path.
33follows Mendoza et al. (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010). We ﬁrst compute the




W + PRI/2 + CI
,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1 line 3), W is wage and salary accruals
(Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietor’s income (Table 1.12 line 9), and CI ≡ PRI/2 + RI +
CP + NI is capital income. Here, RI is rental income (Table 1.12 line 12), CP is corporate
proﬁts (Table 1.12 line 13), and NI denotes the net interest income (Table 1.12 line 18).
The average labor and capital income tax rates can then be computed as
τ
n =
τp(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2
,
where CSI denotes contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1 line 7), and EC
is compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2), and
τ
k =
τpCI + CT + PT
CI + PT
,
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1 line 5), and PT is property taxes (Table
3.3 line 8).
Government spending. Government spending is the sum of government consumption
(Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35) divided by the GDP deﬂator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Total factor productivity (TFP). The construction of TFP closely follows Beaudry




To construct K, we use data on capital services for the private non-farm business sector
(Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity Tables),30 multiply
it by the total capacity utilization rate (Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release G.17 -
Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization), and divide it by the civilian noninstitutional
population above 16 years of age (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q). Real GDP per capita Y is
nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deﬂator (line 1 in Table 1.1.4) and
the population, and per capita hours H are non-farm business hours worked (BLS, Series
PRS85006033) divided by the population. The capital share α is set at 0.2935, the mean over
the sample compiled by the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor
30Quarterly data is interpolated from the annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
34Productivity Tables).
Relative price of investment. The relative price of investment is taken from Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2011). They base their calculations on Fisher (2006).
Output. Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line
1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Investment. Sum of Residential ﬁxed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and nonresidential
ﬁxed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the
civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Consumption. Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable goods (Table
1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1)
and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Real wage. Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series PRS85006103)
divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Inﬂation. Computed as the log-diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Nominal interest rate. Geometric mean of the eﬀective Federal Funds Rate (St.Louis
FED - FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
Hours worked. Nonfarm business hours worked (BLS, Series PRS85006033) divided by
the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q)
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